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This paper aims at exploring the semantic analysis of counterfactual atti-
tudes like wish in English. Counterfactual wish is rarely discussed in the 
literature because it is not a main topic in the semantics of propositional 
attitudes, nor does the standard semantic account of the de re attitudes 
suffice to provide the semantics of counterfactual wish since it poses a 
problem when dealing with counterfactual wish on the grounds that the 
property the attitude holder ascribes to the res cannot be true of the res 
in the actual world. There are two significant characteristics of counter-
factual wish we should consider for its semantic analysis; one is that it is 
involved in the presupposition that the proposition expressed by the 
complement clause does not hold in the actual world, and the other is 
that it is interpreted differently, depending on whether the past tense or 
the past perfect occurs in the complement clauses. On the basis of them, 
this paper proposes an alternative approach to its semantics in which the 
presupposition is incorporated in the ordering source, and the embedded 
past tense is taken to be modal preterit, along the lines of Palmer (1986) 
and Schulz (2014). The presupposition plays the role of constituting a set 
of bouletic accessible worlds that are not compatible with the attitude 
holder’s beliefs. The modal preterit, on the other hand, functions to ex-
clude the actual world and the speech time from the domain of quantifi-
cation for counterfactual wish, and the perfect primarily serves to shift an 
interval backward from the speech time. In this way, we can capture the 
difference in semantic interpretation by making the possible worlds quan-
tified over by wish-counterfactuals with the past tense different from 
those quantified over by wish-counterfactuals with the past perfect.
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1. Introduction
By uttering a sentence like (1), I can express a wish for North Korea 
not to have conducted a nuclear test even though I know that it had 
already done:
(1) I wish that North Korea had not carried out a nuclear test.   
It might make sense for me to express my desire that things would have 
been better if North Korea had not conducted the test. It is about a situation 
that is contrary to fact, and thus, it is called a counterfactual attitude 
(or counterfactual wish henceforth). It is so called in the sense that counter-
factual situations are expressed in the complement clauses of propositional 
attitude verbs. 
This paper is about how to present a semantic analysis of counterfactual 
attitudes induced by the attitude verb wish, as illustrated in (1). I will 
show counterfactual wish poses a problem with the traditional and standard 
approaches to propositional attitude constructions that have been proposed 
in the formal semantics literature (Hinttikka (1969), Kaplan (1979), Lewis 
(1979) and Cresswell and von Stechow (1982) among others). In order 
to provide more adequate semantic account, I will propose an alternative 
approach that is based on modal base and ordering semantics which are 
direct descendant of Kratzer’s (1991) modal semantics. 
2. De se and de re Attitudes 
In this section, I will discuss the standard semantic account of the de 
se and the de re attitudes briefly, focusing on some major works by Lewis 
(1979), and Cresswell and von Stechow (1982), Perry (1979), and Quine 
(1956) among others. The Hintikka style of semantic treatment of attitudes1) 
according to which only a world w is considered as a parameter consisting 
1) Hintikka (1962, 1969) proposes a semantic account of belief sentences according to 
which belief sentences are treated as being involved in universal quantification over 
possible worlds compatible with an agent’s doxastically accessible worlds.
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of a set of possible worlds is problematic, because, as was noted by Lewis 
(1979) and Perry (1979), it fails to deal properly with the insane Heimson 
case (Lewis (1979) and the case of Lingens (Perry (1979)), who suffers 
from amnesia.2) In the insane Heimson case, Himeson falsely believes 
himself to be Hume, as in (2):
(2) Heimson believes that he is Hume. 
According to the Hintikka style semantics, the proposition expressed by 
the complement clause is an empty proposition since there is no possible 
world whatsoever where Heimson is Hume. Thereby, it would have to 
predict that the belief sentence in (2) is necessarily false, contrary to fact.
In order to remedy this, Lewis (1979) argues that the objects of the 
propositional attitudes are self-ascribed properties or de se attitudes, rather 
than propositions. According to him, therefore, ‘x believes p’ is true just 
in case the agent x believes de se that she has a self-ascribed property 
in all possible worlds compatible with what she believes. As a way to 
denote a self-ascribed property, Lewis takes doxastic alternatives to be 
a set of centered worlds, rather than a set of possible worlds. A centered 
world is a triple that consists of a world, a time, and an individual, as 
illustrated in <w, t, a>.3) Given this, a set of doxastically accessible cen-
tered possible worlds can be defined as follows: <w, t, a>Dox<w’, t’, 
a’> iff <w’, t’, a’> satisfies every property which an attitude holder a 
self-ascribes in w at t, where Dox is a doxastic relation between a world, 
an interval, and an individual. Once the doxastic accessibility is defined, 
a belief sentence a believes p is true in w at t iff {<w’, t’, a’>: <w, t, 
2) I will not go into the detailed discussion of the Heimson and Lingens case here to 
save space because they are well-known examples in the literature on the semantics 
of propositional attitudes. The reader may refer to the works cited here for more 
discussion.
3) One anonymous reviewer pointed out that a time t is introduced in centered possible 
worlds out of blue which are taken to be doxastic alternatives in the present study. 
According to Lewis (1979), centered possible worlds are a pair of a world and a des-
ignated inhabitant. However, we need a time parameter for the semantics of counter-
factual wish, since the tense embedded in the complement clause of wish plays a sig-
nificant role of determining how counterfactual attitude constructions are interpreted. 
For this reason, I assume that the centered possible worlds are a triple of a world, 
a time and an individual in this paper.
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a>Dox<w’, t’, a’>} ⊆ p. Note that p here denotes a self-ascribed proposi-
tional property, rather than a proposition, which is intended to express 
properties in term of propositions.
Let us get back to (2) to see how Lewis’s proposal works. According 
to his proposal, the sentence (2) is interpreted to mean that Heimson 
ascribes the property of being Hume to himself, as shown in its IL trans-
lation believe’(heimson, ^xy[x is hume]) in which the content of the attitude 
verb believe is of type <s, <e, <e, t>>> with the denotation of propositional 
properties. (2) is true at t in w iff {<w’, t’, Heimson’>: <w, t, 
Heimson>Dox<w’, t’, Heimson’>} ⊆{<w’’, t’’, Heimson’’>: Heimson 
is Hume in w’’ at t’’}. Given this, Heimson’s self-ascription of the property 
of being Hume still makes him believe that he is Hume. Heimson’s belief 
and Hume’s belief have the same object, i.e., the property of being Hume, 
when they both believe that they are Hume. One should, however, note 
that Hume has the property, while Heimson does not. 
Let us move on to Lewis’s analysis of de re attitudes. I will start with 
the following example, which is inspired by Quine (1956).
(3) Ralph believes that the man wearing sunglasses is a spy.
A sentence like (3) is ambiguous between a de dicto reading in which 
Ralph believes that the man wearing sunglasses, whoever he may be, 
is a spy, and a de re reading in which Ralph believes of the man wearing 
sunglasses that he is a spy. The de dicto reading is about the attitude 
holder Ralph’s belief. As was illustrated in Quine’s Ortcutt example, Ralph 
can believe that the man he saw wearing sunglasses on one occasion 
is a spy, while he may not believe the man he saw wearing sunglasses 
on another occasion is a spy.4) As Quine (1956) argues, thereby, Ralph’s 
de dicto attitudes toward the man in question are not contradictory at 
all even in the possible worlds account of the de dicto reading in (3). 
One should, however, note that according to the possible worlds ac-
count, the attitude holder Ralph would have to be predicted to have a 
4) I will not get into the detailed discussion of the de dicto reading in Quine’s (1956) 
Ortcutt example to save space. The reader can refer to Quine (1956). 
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contradictory belief in case of the de re reading, which is obviously 
unintuitive. To see this, consider the following two scenarios. Scenario 
#1: suppose Ralph glimpsed the man wearing a hat and sunglasses at 
the White House under questionable circumstances several times, and 
believes he is a spy. Scenario #2: suppose also that Ralph glimpsed the 
gray-haired man with the sunglasses on in the Woodley Park, vaguely 
known to him as a pillar of the community, and he does not believe 
he is a spy. The two men Ralph glimpsed on two different occasions 
are one and the same, namely, Ortcutt, but Ralph does not know this. 
Ralph’s attitudes toward the two occasions can be expressed in terms 
of the following sentences:
(4) a. Ralph believes that the man wearing a hat and sunglasses is 
a spy.
b. Ralph does not believe that the gray-haired man wearing sun-
glasses is a spy.
The semantics of the de re interpretation of (4a) and (4b) can be represented 
in terms of the scope analysis as (5a) and (5b), respectively: 
(5) a. x[y[y is a man & y is wearing a hat & y is wearing sunglasses]  x = y] & 
believe(R, ^[x is a spy])].
b. x[y[y is a gray-haired man & y is wearing sunglasses]  x = y] &
believe(R, ^[x is a spy])].
Given the above scenarios, the semantic representations for the de re read-
ing in (5a-b) is not on the right track, due to the fact that they would 
have to predict that the attitude holder Ralph has a contradictory belief. 
(5a) and (5b) together are interpreted to mean that there is a unique person 
(i.e. Ortcutt) that Ralph does and does not believe that the man is a 
spy. This is definitely intuitively incorrect since Ralph has a mistaken 
belief that the men on the two occasions are not one and the same person.
In order to resolve the problem, Lewis (1979) offers a semantic account 
of de re belief which involves attributing some property to an object,5) 
5) Notice that this is also an attempt to take the object of propositional attitudes to denote 
176 Mean-Young Song
more precisely the res, via an acquaintance relation, which is along the 
line of Quine (1956) and Kaplan (1979). An acquaintance relation is a 
relation that an attitude holder bears uniquely to the res. According to 
Lewis, de re belief is semantically interpreted as an attitude holder a ascrib-
ing a property to the res y under some acquaintance relation that a bears 
uniquely to y. Let us get back to (3) and see how the problem will be 
resolved. In scenario #1, Ralph bears an acquaintance relation R1 to the 
man wearing sunglasses in which the man is the unique individual that 
Ralph glimpsed wearing a hat and sunglasses. Relative to this relation, 
Ralph believes that the man wearing sunglasses is a spy. In scenario #2, 
Ralph also bears an acquaintance relation R2 to the man in which he 
is the unique individual that Ralph glimpsed having gray hair and wearing 
sunglasses. Relative to this relation, Ralph does not believe that the man 
wearing sunglasses is a spy. 
On the basis of this idea, Lewis (1979) provides the semantics of the 
de re attitude as follows: “a believes that y is p” is true in w at t iff 
(i) a bears a relation R to y, and (ii) a believes de se that the object to 
which a’ bears R at t’ in w’ has a property p in w’ at t’.6) Based on 
Lewis’s de se attitudes, Cresswell and von Stechow (1982) propose a gener-
alized semantic account of de re belief in conjunction with Hintikka’s 
(1962) semantics of propositional attitudes.7) They propose that proposi-
tional attitude verbs have an extra argument reserved for the res to which 
the attitude holder ascribes a property, with the semantic type <e, <<s, 
<e, <e, t>>>, <e, t>>>.8) According to Cresswell and von Stechow, 
a property, as we saw in Lewis’s semantics of the de se attitudes. In this case, however, 
the attitude holder ascribes the property not to herself but to the thing (or the res) 
to which she bears an acquaintance relation.
6) Lewis (1979) introduces the notion of an essential property of the res into the semantic 
account of the de re attitude. However, I will leave it out here because it is not crucial 
for the semantic analysis of the de re attitudes. As Lewis says, it is not necessary to 
know the essence an individual has in belief de re, since we might be badly 
misinformed. In spite of this misinformation, we still have de re-beliefs about the one 
whom we bear a relation of acquaintance to. 
7) Notice that Cresswell and von Stechow (1982) criticize the possible worlds semantics 
of propositional attitudes proposed by Hintikka’s (1962) for failing to provide an ad-
equate semantic account of the Ortcutt example. Despite this, they incorporate 
Hintikka’s semantics of beliefs into Lewis’s de se account in order to define the notion 
of doxastic accessibility. 
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the semantics of de re attitudes can be defined as follows:
(6) x believes of y that p is true in w at t iff the following two conditions are met;
(i) there is an acquaintance relation R which a bears uniquely to y in w at t, and 
(ii) in every doxastic alternative <w’, t’, a’> of a in w at t, y to which a’ bears R at 
t’ in w’ has the property p in w’ at t’.
Let us go back to (5a-b) and see how the semantics of the de re belief 
in (6) fit in. The sentences in (4a-b) can be semantically represented as 
follows in terms of the semantic account of the de re attitude put forward 
by Lewis (1979) and extended by Cresswell and von Stechow (1982): 
(7) a. x[y[y is a man & y is wearing a hat & y is wearing sunglasses]  x = y] &
believe’(R, x, ^zu[z is a spy])].
b. x[y[y is a gray-haired man & y is wearing sunglasses]  x = y] &
believe’(R, x, ^zu[z is a spy])].
As in (7a), relative to R1, Ralph believes that the man to whom he bears 
R1 is a spy. In this case, the acquaintance relation R1 is this: R1 = {<w’, 
t’, a’>: the individual that a’ glimpsed wearing a hat and sunglasses at 
the White House in w’ at t’}. In case of (7b), Ralph believes, relative 
to R2, that the man to whom he bears R2 is not a spy, and the acquaintance 
relation R2 is this: R2 = {<w’, t’, a’>: the individual that a’ glimpsed 
wearing sunglasses in the Woodley Park in w’ at t’}. Given this, (7a) 
is true in w at t iff (i) there is a unique individual Ralph glimpses wearing 
a hat and sunglasses at the White House in w at t, and (ii) in every 
doxastic alternatives <w’, t’, a’> of Ralph in w at t, the unique man 
a’ glimpses wearing a hat and sunglasses in w at t has the property of 
being a spy in w’ at t’. In the same vein, the truth conditions for (7b) 
can be stated as follows: (7b) is true in w at t iff (i) there is a unique 
individual Ralph glimpses wearing sunglasses in the Woodley Park in 
w at t, and (ii) in every doxastic alternatives <w’, t’, a’> of Ralph in 
w at t, the unique man a’ glimpses wearing sunglasses in w at t is not 
8) This implies that the attitude verb believe for de re interpretation has a different semantic 
type from believe for de dicto interpretation. I will not go into the detail of this here 
because this is not our main concern. 
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a spy in w’ at t’. As we can see in the truth conditions, it’s quite natural 
to say that Ralph believes, relative to R1, that the man is a spy, while 
Ralph does not believes, relative to R2, that the man is a spy, because 
the attitude holder Ralph believes that he encounters two different men 
on the two different occasions, even though he does not notice that the 
two men on the two occasions are one and the same, i.e. Ortcutt. This 
goes with our intuition.
3. Problems Arising from Counterfactual wish
In this section, I will address some limitations of the semantic accounts 
of propositional attitudes that have been proposed in the literature, when 
they deal with counterfactual attitude verbs like wish. One problem the 
standard de re account (cf. Lewis (1979), and Cresswell and von Stechow 
(1982)) is faced with is that counterfactual attitudes do not necessarily 
require an acquaintance relation for their truth, due to the fact that the 
content expressed by wish might exist in the speaker’s (or the attitude 
holder’s) imagination, not in the actual world. The agent (or the attitude 
holder) can imagine that a given res has the property described by the 
counterfactual attitude verb, even if there is no acquaintance relation R 
such that (i) the agent bears R uniquely to the res and (ii) the agent can 
imagine that the res has the property expressed by the complement clause 
of the counterfactual attitude verbs. The arguments which are along the 
line of this can be witnessed in Gennari (1999, 2003) and Ninan (2012), 
even though their motivation to argue against the de re account is somewhat 
different. While providing a semantic analysis of the embedded present 
tense in double-access sentences, Gennari (1999) rejects the account of 
de re attitudes which is based on the acquaintance relation, since acquaint-
ance relations are not always obligatory for the de re interpretation.9) In 
the following sentence Betty believes that the Santa Claus lives on the North 
Pole, for instance, it is improbable that the attitude holder Betty necessarily 
9) I will not go into the detail of Gennari’s (1999) criticism about the de re interpretation 
since the semantics of the embedded tense is what she is mainly concerned with. This 
is the topic that is beyond the present study. 
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have an acquaintance relation uniquely to the Santa Claus for the de 
re interpretation. It is worth noting that the Santa Claus has no reference 
in the actual world, which makes it impossible for anyone to be acquainted 
with him in the actual world. 
Ninan (2012) also makes a point against the introduction of the acquaint-
ance relation into the semantic analysis of imaginary de re attitudes induced 
by verbs like imagine and dream. In the de re account of his infant Ortcutt 
example where the attitude holder imagines Ortcutt, who she see sneaking 
around on the waterfront, is an infant, rather than an adult, for one thing, 
she can have no acquaintance relation to the infant Ortcutt. In other 
words, the properties of the res (i.e. Ortcutt in this case) the attitude holder 
imagines to have in her imagination worlds cannot be true of Ortcutt 
in the actual world who is seen sneaking around on the waterfront. 
Thereby, the standard de re analysis fails for the infant Ortcutt example. 
Imaginary attitudes have something in common with counterfactual 
wish in the sense that they allow us to think about some situations that 
are contrary to fact. Thus, a similar argument against the de re account 
can be made for the case of counterfactual wish. Let us revise the above 
scenario slightly. Suppose that Ralph wishes that relative to R1 (i.e. Ortcutt, 
whom Ralph glimpsed wearing a hat and sunglasses at the White House), 
he saw Ortcutt working as a life guard at Daytona Beach. Given the 
revised situation, Ralph’s wish about Ortcutt is that he does not glimpse 
Ortcutt standing at the White House with a hat and sunglasses on in 
the actual world. Instead, he sees him working as a life guard at Daytona 
Beach in the centered worlds compatible with what Ralph wishes. This 
implies that Ralph is imagining a situation where he does not bear the 
acquaintance relation R1 to Ortcutt, and hence R1 is not a required con-
dition for the de re interpretation of Ralph’s wish. This is a piece of evidence 
against the de re account put forward by Lewis (1979) and extended by 
Cresswell and von Stechow (1982). Thereby, the truth conditions for the 
de re interpretation in (6) above are not sufficient for the semantics of 
counterfactual attitudes like wish and imagine. 
Another problem arising in the semantic analysis of de re attitudes is 
that, as noted by Ninan (2012) and Yanovich (2011), it would have to 
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assert that the imaginary (or counterfactual) property picked out by the 
complement clause do not hold in a set of centered worlds compatible 
with the attitude holder’s imagination, thus predicting that imaginary atti-
tudes cannot be true in the actual world, which is contrary to fact. To 
see this, suppose Ralph utters the following sentence under the above 
modified scenario (i.e. R1):
(8) Ralph imagines that the man he saw at the White House is 
working as a life guard in Daytona Beach.
According to the semantic definition of the de re belief in (6), (8) is true 
if the two conditions are met: the acquaintance relation requirement and 
the universal quantification over centered worlds compatible with Ralph’s 
imagination. The former condition is satisfied since there is really an 
acquaintance relation R1 in this scenario, yet the latter condition is not. 
Note that what Ralph imagines about the man in question is not about 
the actual Ortcutt. The truth conditions for (8) requires that the property 
of the man to whom Ralph has a relation R1 which is described in the 
complement clause in his imagination worlds include the property of being 
in Daytona Beach. However, that property cannot be true of the actual 
Ortcutt, who is seen by Ralph wearing sunglasses at the White House. 
Thus, the semantics of de re in (6) would have to predict that (8) is false 
in the situation under consideration, contrary to fact.  
The final problem which I’d like to mention which the Lewis-style 
semantic approach10) to propositional attitudes in conjunction with 
Hinttikka’s (1962) analysis might have is that it fails to provide accessibility 
relations appropriate for counterfactual attitudes. Unlike other attitude 
verbs such as believe and know etc., counterfactual attitude verbs like wish 
should necessarily quantify over the domain consisting of a set of centered 
worlds where the proposition expressed by the complement clause does 
not hold. To be more precise, the actual world must be necessarily excluded 
from the domain of quantification of counterfactual wish, because it makes 
10) By the Lewis-style semantics of propositional attitudes, I mean the semantic analysis 
which is a descendent of Lewis (1979), including Cresswell and von Stechow (1982). 
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a counterfactual hypothesis about a state of affairs which holds in the 
actual world. For example, the belief sentence John believes that he is happy 
is semantically analyzed as this: for every centered world for John in 
w at t which is compatible with what John believes, John self-ascribes 
the property of being happy. If we adopt this for the semantics of counter-
factual wish, the wish sentence John wishes that he were happy can be in-
terpreted in the same way as this: for every centered world for John in 
w at t which is compatible with what John wishes, John self-ascribes the 
property of being happy. What is it that it means to say “centered worlds 
compatible with what John wishes”? In the belief attitude case, the domain 
of quantification might include the actual world as long as what the agent’s 
beliefs hold in the actual world. However, this is not the case with the 
accessibility relation for counterfactual wish. Recall that counterfactual wish 
presupposes that the content expressed by the complement clause is not 
accepted to be true as far as the attitude holder is concerned. This implies 
that the actual world should be excluded from the domain of quantification 
of counterfactual wish. Thus, we need some semantic device to prevent 
the actual world from being included in the domain of quantification of 
counterfactual wish, which is neglected in the Lewis-style semantic (or 
the standard semantic) account as well as Hintikka’s (1962, 1969) account. 
4. The Usage of Counterfactual wish
In English, counterfactual wish occurs either with the past tense or with 
the past perfect in its complement clause to convey a contrary-to-fact meaning. 
When the past tense is used in its complement clause, it expresses either 
counterfactual or hypothetical future eventualities, as illustrated in (9): 
(9) a. John wishes that he had a car now.
b. I wish I lived in New York next year.
Both a speech-time-oriented adverbial like now and a future-time adverbial 
like next year occur with the past tense in the complement of counterfactual 
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wish in (9a-b). Thus, (9a) is interpreted to convey a situation contrary 
to present fact, while (9b) is understood to make a counterfactual hypoth-
esis about a future situation. However, the past tense is not compatible 
with counterfactual situations where a past eventuality is described:
(10) a. *John wishes that he had a car last year.
b. *I wish I lived in New York when I was young.
In order to make a counterfactual hypothesis about past situations, we 
should use the past perfect in the complement clause of counterfactual 
wish, as shown in (11):
(11) a. John wishes that he had had a car last year.
b. I wish I had lived in New York when I was young.
It is, however, worth noting that the past perfect embedded in the comple-
ment clause of counterfactual wish cannot be used to express hypothetical 
situations about present or future events. This can be supported by the 
fact that the past perfect is not compatible with the speech-time-oriented 
adverbial like now and future-time adverbials like next year:
(12) a. *John wishes that he had had a car now.
b. *I wish I had lived in New York next year.
Here is the summary of the distribution of the past tense and the past 
perfect that are embedded in the complement of counterfactual wish; (i) 
the past time in the complement clause of counterfactual wish makes a 
counterfactual hypothesis about present or future situations, and (ii) the 
past perfect in the complement clause of counterfactual wish makes a 
counterfactual hypothesis about past events or situations.
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5. The Embedded Past Tense as Modal Preterit
As we saw in the previous section, the past tense is closely related 
to counterfactuality in English.11) In this section, thus, I will address what 
the semantic function of the embedded past tense in counterfactual wish 
will be. The past tense in the complement clause of counterfactual wish 
does not behave like a normal past tense. The embedded past tense in 
counterfactual wish can occur with adverbials denoting the speech time, 
rather than with a past time adverbial: 
(13) a. John wishes he were proud of his job now.
b. *John wishes he were proud of his job last year. 
As was discussed above, the content expressed by the complement clause 
is about something that is contrary to a current situation, rather than 
to past situations. 
In the sequence of tense, the time referred to the embedded past tense 
precedes the time denoted by the present tense in the matrix in past-un-
der-present sentences, as in (14):
(14) Mary believes that John raised an objection to her proposal.
In (14) where the past tense is embedded under the present tense, the 
time of John raising an objection is earlier than the time of Mary’s belief. 
But this is not the case with the embedded past in counterfactual wish, 
as in (13). In a past-under-present sentence like (13), the time of John’s 
pride does not precede but overlaps that of John’s wish.12) Given this, 
the embedded past tense in counterfactual wish is not a real past tense 
11) Even though they are not mentioned in this paper, would-conditional constructions 
also show there is a close relationship between the past tense and counterfactuality, 
as in the following sentence: If I had some money now, I would eat a lobster in a fancy 
restaurant. 
12) As a matter of fact, the proposition that is expressed by the embedded clause in (13) 
is not about what is real at the utterance time (more precisely, the time of John’s wish), 
because it does not hold in the actual world at the utterance time at all. Thus, I am 
not convinced whether it is right or not to say that the time of embedded past really 
overlaps the time of the matrix present tense. However, I will put aside this matter here, 
since the purpose of the discussion is to point out that the time of the embedded past 
does not precede that of the matrix present tense in wish-counterfactual constructions. 
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but a fake tense, which is suggested in literature on counterfactuality (see 
Hogeweg (2009), Iatridou (2000), Palmer (1986), Portner (1992), Schulz 
(2014), and M-Y Song (2014) among others).
Thus, the question arises of what grammatical status the past tense 
in counterfactual sentences would be. Iatridou (2000) addresses the ques-
tion, calling the past tense in counterfactuals a fake tense. After discussing 
the past tense morpheme that occurs in a variety of counterfactuals 
cross-linguistically, she proposes the semantics of the fake tense as follows:
(15) T(x) excludes C(x). (Iatridou (2000: 246))
T(x) stands for “Topic(x)”, which means the x that we are talking about, 
and C(x) stands for “the x that for all we know is the x of the speaker.” 
According to (15), the topic times exclude the utterance time and the 
topic worlds exclude the actual world. Given this, the past tense morpheme 
in the antecedent clause of counterfactuals plays the role of considering 
other times than the speech time (i.e. a past time) and other worlds than 
the actual world for the evaluation of counterfactuals. Schulz also makes 
a similar point. He proposes that the fake tense be treated as a modal 
preterit. Following Iatridou (2000) and Schulz (2014), I will take the past 
tense in counterfactuals to be modal preterit which functions to exclude 
the actual worlds and the speech time.  
Following Schulz (2014), I will take the fake past tense in counterfactual 
wish to be the modal preterit (MP). The semantic function of MP is to 
rule out the possibility that the actual world and the speech time might 
be in the domain of quantification by counterfactual wish, as proposed 
by Iatridou (2000). On the basis of this, we can define MP as follows:
(16) Definition of MP
MP(p) is defined iff for any world w, any time t and any propositional property p 
D<<s, <e, t>>>,13) <w, t>z[p(<w, t>) (z)  <w1, t1>[<w1, t1> o <w0, t0> & <w1, 
t1>  p(<w, t>)], where w0, t0 and o are the actual world, the speech time, and the 
overlapping relation respectively.
13) The propositional property is defined as follows: p  D<s, <e, t>> is a propositional 
property iff [  D<s, t> & <w, t>x[<w, t> (x)  <w, t>]]. Recall that propo-
sitional properties, not propositions, are the objects of the propositional attitudes. 
They are intended to incorporate Lewis’s (1979) proposal that the object of the propo-
sitional attitudes is a self-ascribed property.
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According to (16), no propositional properties under the scope of MP 
are true in the actual world w0 at the speech time t0. In this way, MP 
excludes the actual world and the speech time from possible centered 
worlds. This is illustrated in (17):
(17)
How can we define the semantics of MP when it occurs with the past 
perfect embedded in the complement clause of counterfactual wish, as 
in (18a)? 
(18) a. John wishes that Mary had studied semantics.
b. John wishes [TP Maryi [-ed have [ ti study semantics]]]].14)
(18a) is about the situation that runs counter to what happened at a past 
time. As represented in (18b), the past perfect is inside of the scope of 
MP, as in MP(perf). As was discussed in the literature on the perfect (Smith 
(1991) and Stump (1985)), the perfect is characterized by priority to the 
reference time. Thus, we can define MP(perf) as follows, where perf stands 
for the perfect. Since the perfect functions to shift the interval in question 
backward from the reference time, MP(Perf) can be defined as follows:
(19) Definition of MP(Perf (p))
MP(Perf(p)) is defined iff for any a world w, and a time t, and any propositional property
p  D<<s, <e, t>>>, <w, t>z[p(<w, t>) (z)  <w1, t1>[<w1, t1> < <w0, t0> & 
<w1, t1>  p(<w, t>)], where w0 and t0 are the actual world and the speech time, 
respectively.
According to (19), MP excludes a past time t1 and the actual world w1 
at that time, which implies that what is expressed in the embedded clause 
does not hold in the actual world and at that past time. This is how 
14) The representation in (18a) is a LF for a wish-counterfactual construction with the 
past perfect in its complement clause. I will present more detailed account of the 
formation of LFs below in sub-section 6.1  
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the past time and the world at that time are not taken into consideration 
for the evaluation of counterfactual wish, when the past perfect is used 
in its complement clause. This is also illustrated in (20):
(20)
6. Semantics Analysis 
6.1. LFs for Counterfactual wish
Before going into the semantic analysis of counterfactual wish, I will 
present their LFs which are taken to be an input for the semantic 
interpretation. Let us consider two different cases of counterfactual wish; 
one is that where the past tense occurs in the complement clause of wish, 
and the other is that where the past perfect is used in the complement 
clause. First, I will present the LF for the former case, which would 
be something like this:
(21) LF for the past-under-present counterfactual wish
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Comments on the LF in (21): Reject the de re analysis: We don’t have 
to come up with two different propositional attitude verbs, as Cresswell 
and von Stechow (1982) propose: one is for the de dicto and the other 
for the de re. I will pursue the semantic analysis which is based on the 
de dicto attitudes. I adopt the VP-internal Hypothesis in the LF. The subject 
NP(or DP) is base-generated in [SPEC, VP] and moves to [SPEC, TP]. 
This amounts to QR, so the Quantifying-in (QI) rule applies here. In 
the above trees, the Quantifying-in applies at the embedded TP and T’ 
and the matrix TP and VP. l-abstraction over individuals: This is intended 
to take the object of the propositional attitudes to be a propositional 
property. The counterfactual attitude verb wish is of type <<s, <e, t>>, 
<e, t>> which takes a propositional property as its argument and returns 
a set of individuals. This is a function from properties of individuals to 
sets of individuals. The modal preterit is assigned no semantic type, which 
means that it is treated syncategorematically.
Let us move on to the LF for counterfactual wish where the past perfect 
occurs in the complement clause. The LF I have in mind would be like 
this:
(22) LF for the Past-perfect-under-present counterfactual wish
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Comments on the LF in (22): Everything is exactly like (21) except that 
like MP, perfect have is assigned no semantic type, and it is an operator. 
A new node ‘PerfP’(Perfect phrase) is introduced in (22). 
6.2. Semantic Interpretation
I will pursue the semantics of counterfactual wish that is based on 
Kratzer’s (1991) theory of modality characterized by that of relative modal-
ity or ordering modality. The reason why I follow her in this paper is 
that it won’t be necessary for us to consider all accessible worlds. Instead, 
we only consider a set of possible worlds that are relevant to the semantic 
interpretation of a given expression. In other words, this is to impose 
a restriction upon a set of accessible (or alternative) worlds for the modal 
expression in question.
The modal base and the ordering source are a core of Kratzer’s modality. 
The modal base for counterfactual wish would be a set of propositional 
properties that are compatible with what the attitude holder (or the wisher) 
wishes, represented as follows:
(23) The modal base MB for counterfactual wish
MB(<w, t, x>) = wtpx[ x wishes for p in w at t], where p is a propositional 
property of type <s, <e, t>>. 
This is tantamount to this: MB(<w, t, x>) = {<w, t, x>: x wishes for 
p in w at t}. The modal base in (23) for counterfactual wish is defined 
in a way similar to that of other propositional attitude verbs like believe. 
Nothing new is here.
Given (23), the accessibility relation is defined as a set of possible cen-
tered worlds where all the propositional properties in MB(<w, t, x>) are 
true, which can be defined as follows:
(24) Accessibility relation for counterfactual wish
<w’, t’, x’>ACC<w, t, x> iff <w’, t’, x’>  MB(<w, t, x>),
where MB(<w, t, x>) = {<w’, t’, x’>: p[p  MB(<w, t, x>)  <w’, t’, x’>  p]}
Note that <w’, t’, x’>ACC<w, t, x> reads as “a centered world <w’, 
t’, x’> is accessible from <w, t, x>.” According to (24), a centered world 
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<w’, t’, x’> is accessible from <w, t, x> iff it is a member of a set of 
centered worlds where every propositional property in MB is true (or 
realized). 
Since both the modal base and the accessibility relations are defined, 
we are in a position to provide the ordering source for counterfactual 
wish. It functions to order a set of accessible worlds in (24) according 
to a certain ordering relation among worlds in order to determine which 
worlds are better than which worlds. There are two aspects we need to 
consider for the ordering sources for counterfactual wish. One aspect is 
that Lewis’s self-ascribed property should be incorporated into the seman-
tics of counterfactual wish since it is, after all, a propositional attitude 
construction just like a belief sentence. Thereby, I presumably assume 
that an attitude holder x’s wish for a property p is tantamount to saying 
that x believes that p is true in all wished-for worlds for x. The other 
aspect is that counterfactual wish is involved in the presupposition that 
the proposition expressed by its complement clause does not hold in the 
actual world. The leading idea that I will be using, based on this, is 
that the first and the second aspect constitute the primary ordering source 
and the secondary ordering source, respectively.
Given the basic idea of the primary ordering source, as was mentioned 
above, it can be defined as follows, which is along the lines of Cresswell 
and von Stechow (1982), Lewis (1979) and Hintikka (1969): 
(25) The primary ordering source (POS) for counterfactual wish15)
POS(<w, t, x>) = {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: <w’’, t’’, x’’>⊧p[p   MB(<w, t, x>)  
self-ascribe(p)(x)(w)(t)]}
According to (25), the primary ordering source POS is a set of centered 
possible worlds which satisfy every propositional property p in MB(<w, 
t, x>) which x self-ascribes in w at t. The primary ordering source serves 
15) The definition of the primary ordering source presented here is based on that of the 
doxastic alternatives proposed by Cresswell and von Stechow (1982) which can be 
stated as follows: 
(i ) <w’, t’, x’> is a doxastically accessible world from <w, t, x> iff <w’, t’, x’> 
satisfies every property x self-ascribes in w at t.
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to restrict the domain of quantification (i.e.  MB(<w, t, x>) of counter-
factual wish to a set of centered worlds in  MB(<w, t, x>) where the 
attitude holder believes a wished-for propositional property is true. 
Let us get back to the secondary ordering source. Note that counter-
factual wish involves a proposition that the attitude holder of wish believes 
that the proposition expressed by the complement clause is false in the 
actual world at the utterance time. Consider the following sentence:
(26) John wishes Mary lived in New York.
A sentence like (26) has the presupposition that John believes that Mary 
does not live in New York now. In other words, the embedded proposition 
does not hold in the actual world. So the presupposition triggered by 
counterfactual wish can be stated as follows:
(27) [wish’(x, p)]w, g is defined iff an individual x believes that a propositional property p 
is false in w at t (i.e. Bul(<w’, t’, x’>)  M p, where Bul(<w’, t’, x’>) is a set of bou-
letic centered worlds for an agent x).
If the presupposition in (27) is felicitous, the use of counterfactual wish 
is licensed. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be. The presupposition plays an im-
portant role in distinguishing counterfactual wish from future-hypothetical 
wish expressed in terms of an infinitival clause:16)
(28) a. John wishes that he had a luxury car. (counterfactual wish)
b. John wishes to have a luxury car. (future-hypothetical wish)
The difference between (28a) and (28b) is that the presupposition that 
he does not have a luxury car holds, while this is not the case with (28b). 
It follows from what I have discussed above that the secondary ordering 
source SOS for counterfactual wish is a set of propositional properties 
that are not compatible with the attitude holder’s beliefs, since counter-
factual wish presuppose that the proposition expressed by the embedded 
16) Portner (1992) also makes a similar point to this, even though his technical terms 
are different from mine. 
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clause is not true in her belief worlds. Thus, the SOS can be defined 
as follows:
(29) The secondary ordering source (SOS) for counterfactual wish
SOS(<w, t, x>) = {p: p  Dox(<w’, t’, x’>) = }, where Dox(<w’, t’, x’>) is a set 
of doxastic worlds for x’ in w’ at t’.
The ordering source generated by SOS in (29) is a set of propositional 
properties which do the work of determining the ideal worlds in MB(<w, 
t, x>), which constitutes a set of centered worlds quantified over by coun-
terfactual wish. The ordering source also functions to eliminate the worlds 
that are not ideal from MB(<w, t, x>), consequently restricting the do-
main of quantification of counterfactual wish.
On the basis of (25) and (29), the partial ordering relation among cen-
tered worlds established by OS17) can be defined by ]OS(<w, t, x>) as follows:
(30) The ordering relation defined by ]OS(<w, t, x>)
For any v, u  W, for any p  OS(<w, t, x>),18) v [OS(<w, t, x>) u iff {p: <u, t, x> 
 p}  {p: <v, t, x>  p}.
According to (30), a centered world <v, t, x> is either more highly ranked 
than or ranked the same as another centered world <u, t, x> iff every 
propositional properties in OS(<w, t, x>) which is true in <u, t, x> also 
true in <v, t, x>.
Given what I have discussed so far, we can finally define a set of centered 
worlds that are compatible with what the attitude holder wishes. The 
set is taken to be the domain of quantification for counterfactual wish, 
which is represented as Bul, an abbreviation for Bouletic worlds. 
(31) Bouletic accessibility for counterfactual wish (i.e. Bul(<w, t, x>)
Bul(<w, t, x>) = {<w’, t’, x’>: <w’, t’, x’> MB(<w, t, x)> and there is no <u, 
t’, x’>  MB(<w, t, x>) such that <u, t’, x’> [OS(<w, t, x>) <w’, t’, a’>}. 
Recall that the bouletic accessibility in (31) is defined in terms of the 
17) For convenience’s sake, I use the ordering source OS when I refer to POS and SOS.  
18) The mnemonic OS is a cover term for the primary and the secondary ordering source.
192 Mean-Young Song
modal base and the ordering source, which departs from a conventional 
way of defining the domain of the quantification for propositional attitude 
verbs. (31) can be abbreviated as (32):
(32) Bul(<w, t, x>) = {<w’, t’, x’>: best-ranked(MB(<w, t, x>), OS(<w, t, x>))}.
Given (32), we are now in a position to define lexical meaning of counter-
factual wish.
(33) [wish]MB, OS, u is that function f  D<<s, <e, t>>, <e, t>> such that for any p  D<s, <e, 
t>>, for any a  De, f(p)(a) = 1 iff {<w’, t’, x’>: best-ranked(MB(<w, t, a>), OS(<w, 
t, a>))} ⊆ p (i.e. p = {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: p(w’’)(t’’)(x’’) = 1}).
(33) says that [px[wish’((p)(x)]]MB, OS, u is true iff in every bouletically 
accessible world for x, x self-ascribes the property p at <w0, t0> which 
x believes is false at <w0, t0>. In other words, [px[wish’((p)(x)]]MB, 
OS, u is true in w0 at t0 iff every bouletic alternative of x in w0 at t0 is 
an element of {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: p is true in w’’ at t’’}.
In what follows, I will demonstrate how the semantic analysis proposed 
in this paper fits in with counterfactual wish, by giving examples. First, 
let us consider a wish-counterfactual construction in which the past tense 
occurs in the embedded complement clause, as exemplified in (34):
(34) a. John wishes Mary lived in New York.
(35) a. LF for (33): [TP John1 [VP  t1 wishes z [TP Mary2 -ed [VP t2 live in New York]]]]19)
b. IL translation: wish’( j, ^z[MP(live-in-NY’(m))]).20) 
(35a) and (35b) are the LF and IL translation of (34) respectively. The 
truth conditions for (35b) can be stated as follows on the basis of the 
semantic framework that has been developed in this paper: 
19) I will not go into the detailed account of how the LF is derived here because the 
derivation of LF has already been addressed in the previous sub-section. 
20) As was mentioned earlier, I take the object of the propositional attitude to be a 
(self-ascribed) property, following Lewis (1979). Technically speaking, the lambda ex-
pression lz, which does not bind any individual in the embedded formula, is intended 
to take care of this. 
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(36) [wish’(j, ^z[MP(live-in-NY’(m))])]MB, OS, w0, t0 = 1 iff {<w’, t’, x’>: best- 
ranked(MB(<w, t, john>), OS(<w, t, john>))} ⊆ {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: <w0, t0, x> 
lives- in- NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS and [lives-in-NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS, = 1}.
In (36), the formula <w0, t0, x> lives-in-NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS (which 
says Mary lives in New York is false in w0 at t0) is intended to convey 
the meaning of MP that serves to exclude the actual world from the evalua-
tion worlds. This can be rewritten as <w0, t0, x>  {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: Mary 
lives in New York in w’’ at t’’}. Given this, {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: [lives-in- 
NY’(m)(w0 )(t0)]MB, OS = 0 and [lives-in-NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS, = 1} is 
equivalent to {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: Mary lives in New York in w’’ at t’’} – 
{<w0, t0, x’’>}.
According to (36), (35) is true in w0 at t0 iff every bouletic alternative 
of John in w0 at t0 is included in {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: Mary lives in New 
York in w’’ at t’’ and it’s not case that Mary lives in New York in w0 
at t0}. Recall that a set of bouletic alternatives are determined by the 
primary ordering source based on self-ascribed properties, and the secon-
dary ordering source based on presupposition. If in every bouletic worlds 
<w’’, t’’> besides <w0, t0>, John happens to have the property he self-as-
cribes in w0 at t0, then it follows that Mary lives in New York in w’’ 
at t’’, but not in w0 at t0 (this means that Mary does not lives in New 
York in the actual world at the utterance time, but she lives in worlds 
that are compatible with John’s wish). Otherwise, it would be false. This 
is a desired result.
Let us move on to counterfactual wish where the past perfect is embedded 
in the complement clause, as in exemplified in (37):
(37) John wishes Mary had lived in New York.
(38) a LF: [TP John1 [VP  t1 wishes z[CP [TP Mary2 -ed [PerfP have [VP t2 live in New York]]]]]].
b. IL translation: wish’( j, ^z[MP(Perf(live-in-NY’(m)))]).
The truth conditions for (38b) can be stated as follows:
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(39) [wish’(j, ^z[MP((Perf (live-in-NY’(m)))])]MB, OS, W0, t0 = 1 iff {<w’, t’, x’>: best- 
ranked(MB(<w, t, john>), OS(<w, t, john>))}⊆ {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: w1t1[<w1, t1> < 
<w0, t0> & <w1, t1>  lives-in- NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS]21) and [lives-in- 
NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS = 1}.
In (39), w1t1[<w1, t1> < <w0, t0> & <w1, t1>  lives-in- 
NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS ] (which says there is a world-time pair <w1, t1> 
preceding <w0, t0> such that Mary didn’t live in New York in w1 at 
t1) is intended to convey the meaning of MP(PerfP) that serves to exclude 
a world w1 at a past time t1, which has been shifted backward from the 
actual world and the utterance time, from the domain of quantification. 
Thereby, {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: w1t1[<w1, t1> < <w0, t0> & <w1, t1> lives-in- 
NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS ] and [lives-in- NY’(m)(w’’)(t’’)]MB, OS = 1} is logi-
cally equivalent to {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: Mary lives in New York in w’’ at 
t’’} – {<w1, t1, x’’>}.
According to (39), (38b) is true in w0 at t0 iff every bouletic alternative 
of John in w0 at t0 is included in {<w’’, t’’, x’’>: Mary lives in New 
York in w’’ at t’’ and it’s not case that Mary lives in New York in w1 
at t1 that is earlier than t0}. If in every bouletic worlds <w’’, t’’>  for 
John besides <w1, t1> prior to <w0, t0>, John happens to have the property 
he self-ascribes in w0 at t0, then it follows that Mary lives in New York 
in w’’ at t’’, but not in w1 at t1. This means that Mary did not lives 
in New York in w1 at t1 that precedes the actual world w0 at the utterance 
time t0, but she lived in other worlds that are compatible with John’s 
wish. Otherwise, it would be false. This is a desired result. 
7. Closing Remarks
This paper has been an attempt to provide a semantic analysis of counter-
factual wish, which are not properly treated in the literature on formal 
semantics. Counterfactual wish is characterized by the fact that the past 
tense and the past perfect are used in the embedded clauses to express 
contrary-to facts, and this leads to semantic difference. In order to account 
for the difference, I have argued that a set of centered worlds the former 
21) This is equivalent to w1t1[<w1, t1> < <w0, t0> & [lives-in- NY’(m)(w1)(t1)]MB, OS = 0].
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quantifies over is different from a set of centered worlds the latter does. 
This can be accomplished through the treatment of the embedded past 
tense as Modal Preterit (MP), along the lines of Iatriou (2000) and Schulz 
(2014), which functions to rule out the actual world and the utterance 
time. The past perfect plays the role of shifting an interval backward from 
the utterance time. In defining the domain of quantification of counterfactual 
wish, or the bouletic accessibility, I have come up with the two ordering 
sources, the primary and the secondary ordering source, on the basis of 
ordering semantics slightly modified from Kratzer (1991). The primary or-
dering source is a reflection of Lewis’s (1979) self-ascribed property. The 
secondary ordering source, on the other hand, has been implemented as 
a device to incorporate into presupposition triggered by counterfactual wish, 
and leads to a sharp semantic distinction between counterfactual wish and 
hypothetical wish to take infinitival clauses as its complements.
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